far from being concèived as a species-being." M a r x calls attention to the impact of market society on male/female relations in a gibe against prostitution and loveless marriages of convenience that prefigures the fuller 1844 Manuscripts discussion. In market society, "The species-relation itself, the relation between m a n r and woman, etc., becomes an object of trade! The woman is bought and sold."
These passages are the stock-in-trade of expositors of Marx. I rehearse these familiar quotations partly to anticipate a contrast to be d r awn later in this p a p e r , 7 and partly to emphasize a change in Marx's attitudes on these issues that becomes evident in the 1844 M a n u s c r i p t s . The change I have in mind is not M a r x 's answer to the question: w h o w ill bell the cat? Who or what can be the agency that overcomes the state/ civil society split? M a r x 's answer to that pressing question is, of c o u r s e , the proletariat, and he gives this answer in an 1843 "Introduction" to a never-completed contribution to the critique of H e g e l 's Philosophy of R i g h t . Of the several respects in wh ich the 1844 Manuscripts m a r k a transition in M a r x 's intellectual development, the one I want to stress is that alongside the familiar theme of overcoming the split between state and civil society there appears here a n e w and strongly voiced concern w i t h the unfair and lopsidedly unequal power relations that are endemic in, and partly constitutive of, capitalist market society. Power becomes problematic for Marx only between April and August of 1844; in earlier essays he rather surprisingly attacks the Hegelian synthesis of a bourgeois economic order and constitutional monarchy from the standpoint of "true democracy," criticizes nascent market society for its fostering of egoism, asserts that the great misery and oppression suffered b y the proletariat w i ll bring it about that the proletariat will be a great emancipatory force-all w i t h barely a mention of the problems of uneaual power that reverberate intensely throughout his later writing.
In the first half of 1844 Marx produces what appears to be the last of his early writings which ignores power-some "Comments" on a French translation of James Mill's Elements of Political E c o n o m y . Overcoming bourgeois egoism and overcoming unjust bourgeois concentrations of power both receive paramount stress, roughly equal billing, in the Ma n u s c r i p t s . Marx's conception of alienation bundles together these two disparate complaints against market society (along w i t h others, as w e will have occasion to notice below). As a first approximation, it would be fairly accurate to say that for Marx one is alienated to the degree that two conditions hold:
(1) one lacks a fair share of control over one's w o r k activity and over the disposition of the products created by o n e 's work, and (2) one fails to fulfill o n e 's 5 6 7 5 5I b i d .
6I b i d .,
172; MEW, 375.
7 Cf. sections III and V below.
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29 species-beingj w h ich is the n o r m of engaging in purposive labor in order to serve the universal human community.8 Although for his own purposes M a r x squeezes conditions (l) and (2) together under the umbrella concept of alienation, it is w orth noting that lacking control over o n e 's w o r k and products and failing to serve the human species are conceptually distinct matters. One can imagine a society absorbed completely into a big crusade, w h i c h upholds some overarching social goal that elicits constant selfless effort from all, and which organizes the crusaders hierarchically into distinct stations of markedly unequal power. In this imaginary society the rift between state and civil society wh i c h troubles Marx is fully overc o m e , but it remains a very open question whether power relations are fair. People at the bottom of the social hierarchy might accept the moral purpose of the crusade and be as self lessly devoted to that purpose as anybody, yet object on grounds of unfairness to their inferior status, and they could be right to protest in this way. On the other hand, we can equally well picture a market society composed of people w h o are narrowly selfish, and exactly equal in talent, luck, w o r k habits, initial endowments of resources, and all other factors Since Marx does not draw any line between the core of his concept of alienation and his ramified description of closely associated phenomena, I prefer not to argue for the accuracy of m y definition beyond saying I believe it picks out two strands that are clearly important to Marx. I tie in a third strand in section V below. In defining "alienation" in terms of the presence of one or b o t h of two independent conditions, I do not m e a n to deny that one can give a more abstract unitary characterization of the concept. Notice that on m y proposed definition alienation is a m a t t e r of the objective relation of the self to the world, so one can be alienated without feeling alienated or experiencing oneself as alienated, I take it that when, in the "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" section of the M a n u s c r i p t s , Marx criticizes Hegel for conceiving alienation just i n terms of consciousness and self-consciousness, he has in m i n d the idea that, e.g., the worker who lacks control over his w o r k environment is alienated whatever he feels about it, whatever illusions he m a y have about his condition.
One final clarification. M a r x 's discussion of species-being starts w i t h the Feuerbachian notion that m a n is conscious of himself as one of a kirid, one human among others. It proceeds to tease out of this species-conscious ness the n o r m of social production for a universal human community. Noticing this, one wri t e r comments that " M a r x 's justification of his contention that m a n has an essential 's o c i a l ' nature is a poor one; for it involves introducing the expression 'species-being' in one sense, and then making use of it in another." (Richard Schacht, Alienation (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1971), 89). The text here is fragmentary, but I think it is plausible to locate in it an implicit appeal by Marx to something akin to Kantian universalization: if m a n is rational and selfinterested, and perceives himself to be one member of a species essentially like all other members, the question must arise, "Other members of m y species have desires as pressing as mine. I s n 't it arbitrary for m e to labor only for the satisfaction of m y desires, or for the satisfaction of seme p e o p l e 's desires and not others?" Under capitalism each human perceives the desirability of serving the species and the excessive cost to himself o f doing so, while acting on a capitalist market. Alienation from the species thus becomes an internal conflict, never quite suppressed, with i n the individual. that causally influence market distribution. The social relations among such persons could be market relations conducted without the burden o f any lopsided power inequalities.
There is nothing at all intellectually disreputable about packing together distinct and compatible ideas under a canmon concept. But even a cursory reading of the Manuscripts forces on the reader the impression that Marx has not got the different elements in his account sorted out properly (Marx's fault is venial, occurring as it does in a w o r k that is an unfinished rough draft). One source of this impression is the loose talk Marx bandies about h o w one aspect of alienation follows from another as b y logical necessity.
"We have yet a third aspect of estranged labour to deduce fran the two already considered," Mara says Just as he is about to make a long leap fran discussing the powerinequality side of alienation to discussing the species-being side of alienation. In an earlier passage, after asserting that the relation of the worker to the objects of production and to his production itself is a "consequence" of the relation of labor to its produce, Marx asks rhetorically, "How would the worker came to face the produce of his activity as a stranger, were it not that i n the very act of production he was estranging himself fran himself ?"9 T o this query the unrhetorical answer is that sometimes workers d o manage to gain considerable control over their w o r k life while holding negligible control over their w ork products (e.g. Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel, or if that p re capitalist example seems suspect, consider skilled tool and dye makers in relation to their wo rk products). N o doubt one can probably recon struct most of what Marx says around the idea that under empirical con ditions that steadily obtain In capitalist society, the various aspects of alienation that Mara isolates are as a matter of fact always found together, as parts of a canmon syndrane with canmon causal antecedents. But the feeling persists that Mara is not fully in control of the materials he is handling.
Failure to distinguish clearly between the power-inequality idea and the species-being idea leads Mara into serious error in the section of the Manuscripts that has been labelled "Geld." Mara is trying to con vince us that there is something inherently morally suspect about If this has the look of plausibility to it, I suggest this is only so because Marx paints into the example an irrelevant and garish detail, namely, that unequal distribution of money confers power to dominate other human beings. Money furnishes a lame rich m a n w i t h liveried servants and a carriage. W e suppose it is terrible that the twelve m e n must wait hand and foot on the one. But before being swept along b y this sentiment into assent to M a r x 's conclusion we would do well to isolate the self-interested use of money from its vastly unequal distribution. Imagine a poor lame boy who gives a few pennies to a poor carpenter in exchange for a pair of crutches. No doubt it would be nice if the car penter were willing to make the crutches for the boy without the payment, or if the lame b o y were willing to give his pennies to the carpenter without thought of reciprocal benefit, although in the latter case we might wonder w h y the b o y does not take care of his own vital interests before indulging in the luxury of philanthropy. But surely there is nothing ±n the slightest degree morally suspicious about mutually selfinterested exchange in these circumstances. And wh y is it even prima facie objectionable that the lame b o y 's powers are not limited to his (morally arbitrary) genetic endowment, but can be expanded through clever exchange? There definitely is something aesthetically satisfying about fairy tales in which the handsome prince marries the beautiful princess, after suitable travail, but from the standpoint of social criticism one should pause before hurling at capitalism the objection that the cosmetics industry enables ugly boys and girls' occasionally to thwart nature and w i n the hand of the handsome m a n or maiden. Marx affects to be upset by the manner in w hich a person can purchase things he has not achieved or acquired through his own resources: ''That w h i c h I a m unable to do as a man, and of w hich therefore all m y individual essential powers are incapable, I a m able to do by means of m o n e y . M oney thus turns each of these powers into something w h ich in itself it is not-turns it, that is, into its c o n t r a r y . I s n ' t this just a ten dentious w a y of saying that trade (for money here is inessential, barter will d o the trick, though less efficiently than filthy lucre) enables a person to benefit from the acquirements and achievements of others w h ich the individual left to his own resources could not attain to any thing like the same extent, in the absence of trade? Here I m e a n to neglect the d e b a t e r 's point that trade by itself in no w a y implies egoism, for the traders m a y be intending to confer the benefits of exchange on third parties for purely altruistic motives. However, I cannot resist ccmmenting on one final quote : ''Assumé m a n to be man, " says Marx, ''and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then y ou can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc. The section on money in the Manuscripts indicates plainly that some at least of Marx's worries about private property in that w o r k are continuous w i t h the uneasiness expressed in "On the Jewish Question" at the circum stance that bourgeois rights admit of a selfish exercise.
(After noti n g that m o ney mediates between "man's need and the object, between his life and his means of life," Marx frets, "But that w h i c h mediates m y life for me, also mediates the existence of other people for me. F o r m e it is the other person."-12 Ownership of money, alas, allows concern for persons to be transmuted into concern for cash.) Private property rights are rights people have w i t h respect to objects, including the right to exclude others frcm the use of the object, the right to use t h e object oneself, the right to dispose of the object as one wishes, the right to sell or otherwise transfer the object and one's rights in it t o others. A private property system is a social order that secures private property rights. Besides criticizing the capitalist private property system described in the works of Smith and, say, Ricardo, Marx proposes the abolition of private property and its replacement b y ccmmunism. This is to occur ih three stages: frcm crude communism to political ccmmunism to the genuine ccnmunism that is "the riddle of history solved" and the "positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement. '*13 Marx thinks that on the basis of his analysis of estranged labor he is entitled to treat private property and estrangement as correlative terms, for the existence of estrangement (or alienation) implies the existence of private property. The argument for this conclusion is unsound. Marx says that if the worker does not control his work activity or w o r k products, then somebody else must enjoy this control, and to enjoy control over w o r k activity or w o r k products is l2Ibid., 323; MEW, 563.
l3Ibid., 296-297; MEW, 536.
0 1 3 33 t o own them. Thus the worker's lack of control implies the private property of the capitalist over that which the worker does not control. The first step of this argument m a y be doubted. In a primitive society authoritative custom m a y regulate production, so that the domination of custom over the worker does not Imply that any other person has the freedom the worker lacks. Be that as it may, even if one accepts that the worker's lack of control over production implies that some other person exercises control, it does not follow that this control must be enjoyed in the form of full private property rights of the sort that characterize capitalism (e.g., think of the serf in relation to the feudal lord).I1* At any rate, whether or not Marx is warranted in be liev ing that alienation implies private property, it is this belief that leads h i m to think that the negation of private property implies the negation of alienation. In this w a y the term "private property" expands in Marx's thinking so that the term refers not just to a legal-institu tional complex of rights but also to forms of culture and human sensibil ity and motivation that are associated w i t h this complex of rights.
The elimination o f private property that is equivalent to the elimi nation of alienation is, Marx seems to acknowledge, no simple task. In language that recalls the formulations of "On the Jewish Question," Marx envisages a three-stage process encompassing (1) the attempt to abolish private property within civil society, while leaving the state intact (this yields crude communism), (2) an attempt to abolish private property in political life, w h i c h amounts to the "abolition of the state," and finally (3) an attempt to abolish private property in both civil society and the state w h ich proceeds frcm a recognition of the "human nature of n e e d " and on this epistemic foundation effects a transformation of human nature (this yields genuine cornmunism). About the second stage Mar x says very little. About the third stage, the definitive resolution of the conflict "between m a n and nature, between m a n and m a n , .. .between exis tence a n d essence, between freedom a n d necessity, between the individual and the species,"15 etc., Marx understandably waxes enthusiastic. The most interesting remarks describe the first stage, crude communism.
This argument occurs at ibid., 278-279; M E W , 518-519. It might be thought that Marx means to restrict the concept of alienation so that it is distinctive of capitalism; from w h i c h it would (perhaps) follow that alienation implies full private property and the capitalist owner of same. M a r x himself scotches this possibility w h e n he writes, "The dom i nation of the land as an alien power over m e n is already inherent in feudal landed property." He also characterizes feudal property as "the earth wh ich is estranged frcm m a n and hence confronts him in the shape of a few great lords," at ibid., 266; M E W , 505.
15Ibid., 296; MEW, 536.
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In institutional terns crude communism has three distinguishing features:
(1) all m e n are equally workers, and the ccmmunity functions as the single "capitalist" for w h o m all work, (2) an equal distribution of wages and wealth is enforced, and (3) an attempt is made to Inpose a s t e m egalitarianism that destroys whatever is not suitable for division into equal shares or for common possession by all as property (e.g. the achievements of culture and civilization which exceed the comprehension of the least able). Marx sums up the gist of this social order w i t h the assertion that crude communism represents the generalization of private property. In cultural terns, the motivations for establishing and sus taining crude communism are envy (the desire of a person that others not enjoy any advantages or good fortune that he lacks) and the levelling desire to reduce all to a common level. Marx comments that the envy of crude communism is an avatar of the greed that dominates capitalism. It m a y be said that this idea of the ccmmunity of women gives away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism.16
II
In the approach to w o man as the spoil and handmaid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in wh i c h m a n exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its u n a m b iguous, decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of m a n to w o man and in the manner in which the direct and natural species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of m a n to w o m a n . In this natural species-relationship man's relation to nature is immediately l6Ibid., 295; MEW, 534.
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35 his relation to man, just as his relation to m a n is immediately his relation to nature-his own natural destination. In this relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to which nature to h i m has become the human essence of man. P r c m this relationship one can therefore judge man's whole level of development. F r o m the character of this relationship follows h o w m u c h m a n as a species-being, as man, has ccme to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of m a n to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to whic h man's natural behavior has become human, or the extent to wh i c h the h uman essence in h i m has become a natural essence-the extent to w hich his human nature has come to be natural to him. This relationship also reveals the extent to w h ich man's need has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other person as a person has become for h i m a need-the extent to w hich he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being.17 M a rx articulates two thoughts here: first, that the nature of male/female relations in crude communism is a definitive indication of the moral quality of the culture, and second, male/female relations are always an accurate barometer of social progress. B o t h thoughts are problematic. I take up the first idea first.
The plan to turn all wo men into common property, public parks for the free enjoyment of males, is puzzling because it would appear to violate the universalistic spirit of crude communism. If the intent is to de scribe crude communism as providing institutional guarantees of certain equal rights but inadequate nonetheless due to the crude and grudging popular culture that sustains these rights, then it must be admitted that so far from revealing the true nature of crude communism, the turn ing of w omen into cannon property just contradicts the original descrip tion of the scheme. Contrary to its initial characterization, crude communism does not achieve equal distribution of wealth, since m e n possess forms of weal t h that w omen lack, and for w h ich they receive no compensat ing advantage.
It's as though Marx were arguing against the conception of communism as equal distribution by claiming that in such a system there w o uld be grossly unequal distribution as between mem b e r s of hostile ethnic groups. The evil in the conmunity-of-women idea has nothing to do w i t h the purported inadequacies of crude communism but rather is a m a tter of the crude oppression of women.
It is easy to fit this passage from Marx alongside the unedifying history of philosophers who have professed to be scandalized by other philosophers' comments on sexuality (cf. Hegel on Kant's v i e w that m a r riage involves a contract between husband and wife in which both parties acquire limited property rights in one another's bodies). It is also easy 17Ibid., 295-296; MEW, 535.
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to locate the specific source of Marx's confusion in the passage. Implicitly Manx is assuming that none but m e n are workers in crude com munism; hence, the equal rights that apply to all workers do not affect the status of women. Crude communism appears to acknowledge just two statuses, that of being a worker and a piece of property. Not falling into one status, w omen are forced into the other. But why should a r a d ical critic of bourgeois society assume that w o men will predominantly remain confined to the heme, cut off from the arena of industry where human emancipation is being effected? To make too m u c h of this lapse on Marx's part would be unfair, for he corrects it in the Communist M a n i f e s t o . There and in his later analysis of women's estate, jointly executed w i t h Engels, a key assertion is that women's obtaining equal access to socially productive paid labor is a precondition of their emancipation from the tyranny of the male breadwinner, whose control over family in come tends to give h i m control over family life even in the absence of legal encumbrances to equal partnership in marriage. 18
Even if we abstract from the "women workers" slip, Marx's critique of crude communism by w a y of a critique of the status of women under a crude communist regime is ill thought out. M a r x writes, "Just as wo m a n passes from marriage to general prostitution, so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man's objective substance) passes from the relation ship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state Having raised some puzzles about Marx's claim that one can read off the real character of crude communism frcm its treatment of women, I turn n o w to his generalization of this claim. Marx observes that since "the direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of m a n to w o m a n , " by observing this relation in any society one can tell ''the extent to w h i c h the human essence has become nature to man," and so "judge man's whole level of development." There is, nowever, something both romantic and Victorian in Marx's phrasing, w h ich emerges into focus w h e n we notice that Marx's barometer of progress in male/female relations is set just to measure degrees of the overcoming of the split between the state and civil society in the sexual sphere. Marx is unequivocal on this point. The less we behave like bourgeois egoists in our sexual relations, the more our needs have become needs for the other person, the higher the level of our civiliza tion's development. 23Ibid., 310 ; MEW, 150.
W i t h part of what
The difficulty is that sexual relations are preeminently an area of life where the survival of egoistic and even animal-like desires is w i t h out qualification a good thing. Par from seeming a perhaps unattainable but still nobly inspiring goal, the overcoming of bourgeois egoism here takes on a decidedly unattractive aspect. Marx has uncritically assimi lated into his communist ideal coinnonplace prejudices against simple desires for quotidian bodily pleasures, prejudices not in substance dif
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that Marx himself quotes and endorses in The Holy F a m i l y , written a y ear later: "The change in a historical epoch can always be determined by the progress of women toward freedom, because in the relation of wom a n to man, of the w e a k to the strong, the victory of human nature over brutality is most evident. The degree of emancipation of women is the natural measure of general e m a n c i p a t Similarly, a society could seemingly make great strides toward sexual equality without scoring h i g h on Marx's scale of desirable male/female relations. Consider a society in which the law and other m a j o r social institutions include n o practises that discriminate on the basis of sex, in w h i c h the physiological differences between m e n and wanen (e.g. that m e n tend to be physically stronger) do not correlate w i t h differences in status and reward (e.g. the society does not glorify physical strength or confer excessive rewards on the strong),25 a n d in which the enforce ment of law is effective, so that the incidence of coercion and violence inflicted b y the members of one sex upon another is low. The members of such a society m a y not be specially altruistic or sympathetic. It might even be common practise in the society for large numbers of me n or w o m e n to sequester themselves voluntarily from the opposite sex for long periods of time. So long as the rights of w o m e n (and men) are secure, it is inappropriate to criticize this imaginary society for failure to nurture a high level of affection between m e n and women. Once again the goal of overcoming the split between the state and civil society reveals itself to be morally problematic.
Ill
The ambiguities of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts comments o n w omen are important because their extreme nature glaringly illuminates a moral objection to the basic standpoint of the early Marx. Or so I have argued. Tracing the further development of Marx's views on w omen shows very plainly that the m o r a l objection which-if valid-vitiates the early philosophical argumentation does not apply wi t h the same force to his mature thought. Marx's changing views on women help the reader to form a balanced assessment of the normative quality of his early as opposed to his later writing. This topic is tangled, and cannot be unravelled in a short essary. First let us pull a single thread. * 2 2ifaWhat would count as serving a universal community? If there were a just world-wide economic order, contributions to it might be plausible candidates for such service. 25C f. Jane English, "Sex Equality in Sports," Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 7, no. 3 (Spring, 1978) , 275.
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In The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels reply in two polemical thrusts to the accusation that communism proposes the abolition of the family.
They argue that when the bourgeois who considers his wife an instrument of production hears that communism aims at cannon ownership of the m e a n s of production, he mistakenly infers that communism aims at common ownership of women, whereas what is really aimed at is "to do away w i t h the status of w omen as mere instruments of production." They also argue that in contrast to bourgeois society in which prostitution and adultery are prevalent, "it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing fran that system, i.e. of prostitution b o t h public and private."26 Neither argument hints that the abolition of capitalist private property necessarily presages any large-scale flowering of altruism or sympathy or love. The first argument identifies communism with the ending of unfair power inequalities between the sexes. The second argument draws out a consequence of achieving equality of p o w e r between the sexes wh e n this is coupled w i t h the elimination of in equalities of power between economic classes: if women experience prostitution as degrading and engage in the practise only under the pressure of economic coercion, the elimination of this economic coercion will take away the sole motivation that sustains prostitution. Whi l e this argument m a y be unrealistic in its assumption that no person would voluntarily choose a life of prostitution, note that Marx and Engels do not here indulge in far-fetched claims about the blossoming of huma n un selfishness to be brought about by the arrival of communism. Nor is there any other passage in the Manifesto w h i c h suggests that communism has anything particularly to do w i t h the goal of substituting love of others for love of self.
(Indeed the claim that communism establishes a form of association in wh i c h "the free development of each is the condi tion for the free development of all" is exactly the claim-reminiscent of Rousseau-that communism will bring into existence a set of institu tions in which self-interested behavior is not to be feared because the individual can benefit himself only by benefitting all.26a. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, writt e n by Engels in what he says is an attempt to reproduce the notes of a deceased Marx, further clarifies the fate, in the later Marx, of the early philo sophical themes of overcoming the split between state and civil society and ending the alienation of m a n frcm his species-being. Marx never renounces these themes, he occasionally declares an allegiance to them, but their displacement from the center of his thought is undeniable. I t 's not just that the terminology changes, the concepts the terminology expresses also shift. In M a r x 's writings dating from the Communist Manifesto the concept of species-being is reduced fran the status of a central normative programmatic focus to a vestigial concern, almost a ceremonial embellishment. Marx in his maturity cones to assign first priority to the goal of completing and furthering bourgeois justice rather than to the goal of overcoming bourgeois egoism, and this changed Both of the claims I a m urging-the survival and the reduced signifi cance of the species-being idea as compared to the power-inequality idea-receive support frcm The Origin of the F a m i l y . In the midst of anthropological speculations about the ancient gens, Engels inserts a b r ief digression on the probable relations between the sexes under com m u n i s m that dots the i 's and crosses the t's on the somewhat elliptical, aphoristic phrasing of the M a n i f e s t o . In bourgeois society, the theory and practise of marriage and love are at loggerheads. The n o r m is that one should undertake marriage only from the motive of love for o n e 's partner; the reality is that economic considerations, particularly the prevailing absence of opportunity for the woman to earn a living outside of marriage, but also the constraints confining choice of partner to a m e mb e r of one's economic class and the considerations stemming frcm bourgeois inheritance of property, render free choice in most instances illusory.
'' Full freedom of marriage can therefore only be generally established," says Engels, "when the abolition of capitalist production and of the property relations created by it has removed all the accom panying economic considerations w h ich still exert such a powerful influ ence on the choice of a marriage partner."27 Engels then ventures a tentative prediction about what marriage pra c tises we can expect to see develop under carmunism. Communist economic arrangements subtract all existing motivations to marry n o w extant, except mut u a l inclination. Communist marriage will accordingly be based solely on the m u t u a l inclination of the partners.
"And as sexual love is by its nature exclusive," one can predict that ccnmunist marriage w i ll in each case involve just two persons. Even more diffidently, Engels predicts that monogamous marriage will be the most conmon form of marriage under comnunism. The higher incidence of monogamy will be a consequence of establishing equality of power between prospective mates, for assuming that w omen more strongly incline to monogamy than men, wit h more power women will be more able to give effect to their will to m o n o gamy. A f ter these remarks, w h i c h m a y disappoint or comfort the reader, it is to give themselves to a m a n from any other considerations than real love, or to refuse to give themselves to their lover fran fear of the economic consequences. W h e n these people are in the world, they will care precious little what anybody today thinks they ought to do; they will make their own practise and their cor responding public opinion about the practise of each individ ual-and that will be the end of it.^°A part from the perhaps facile identification of sexual equality and com munist economic equality, and the lack of nervousness about public opin ion in the last sentence, these splendid lines could well have been wr i t t en b y John Stuart Mill. What is of primary Importance to Engels here is the elimination of unjust inequalities of power between the sexes w hich he believes communism will bring about. Of decidedly secondary importance is his hope that the removal of power inequalities that place individuals in predicaments from which squalid selfish behavior often appears the best or only choice, will leave r o o m for the natural human disposition toward love and reciprocal affection to assert itself in action w i t h greater frequency (this is not a claim that communism will totally transform human nature in the direction of a N e w Testament ideal, but a claim that roughly the same old human nature put in more favorable circumstances will express itself in more desirable actions). But Engels very tightly hedges this assertion of hope w i t h the robust statement that under conditions of fair equality individuals will establish their own forms of consensual relations, whatever these might b e -and that is really all there is to be said about it. This is a conversation-stopper not only for the exercises in prediction but for the normative discussion as we l l . 29 and, secondly, indissolubility. pO°E ngels, ibid.,
73; M E W , 8 3.
Here it is unclear whether Engels is saying, plausibly, that communist economic equality is a necessary condition for women's attainment of equality w i t h men, or, less p l a u s i b l y , that it is a sufficient condition as well. 
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of a "state of the future"; we have seen h o w matters stand in this respect) the state has need, on the contrary, of a very s t e m education by the people.34
One might say that w h e n Marx here objects to capitalist-controlled states interfering in the education of the people, it does not at all follow that he would entertain any reservations whatsoever about direct state management of the schools w h e n the state canes to be controlled b y the proletariat in early communist society. One might point to the Ccmnunist Manifesto35 for a hint tossed out by Marx and Engels that this proposed interpretation of their thought on education is correct. However, decisive evidence against this interpretation is forthcaning i n The Civil W a r in F r a n c e . In a n enthusiastic description of the features of the Paris Commune which m a r k it as "the positive f o m of that Republic" w h i c h is to supercede "class-rule itself," Ma r x writes, "The whole of the educational institutions were opened to the people gratuitously, and at the same time cleared of all inteference of Church a nd State."36 if talk of excluding the Church from influence over the school sounds like a threatened denial of freedom of worship, endorsed b y Marx, a sentence from the same paragraph just quoted should clarify Marx's meaning: The Commune disestablished and disendowed the Church, and "The priests were sent back to the recesses of private life, there to feed up o n the alms of the faithful in imitation of their predecessors, the Apostles."
It is true that after asserting that the early phase of communist society will uphold bourgeois rights, and correctly so, Marx airs seme reservations about rights and then announces w i t h evident relief that in a higher phase of communist society the "narrow horizon of bourgeois right" can "be crossed in its entirety." It is w orth examining the argumentative context in which this slogan is imbedded.
In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased w i t h the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantlyonly then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed 
